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For the animal shall not be measured by man. In a world older and more
complete than ours, they move finished and complete, gifted with the
extension of the senses we have lost or never attained, living by voices we
shall never hear. They are not brethren, they are not underlings: they are
other nations, caught with ourselves in the net of life and time, fellow
prisoners of the splendour and travail of the earth.
Henry Beston, The Outermost House

Introduction
The ‘cross-race’ or ‘own-race’ effect denotes the increased ease with which humans recognise
faces from their own race compared to those from other races (Bothwell et al.). This
phenomenon, whose selective aspect is plastic and may disappear following sufficient exposure
to other races (Sangrigoli et al.), is equally applicable to interspecies contexts. In fact, nuances in
appearance, facial definition and expression, body language, and even, or particularly, intracommunity interactions of other animal species can easily be missed if humans are deprived (or
deprive themselves) of participation in the animals’ worlds, be it direct participation involving
interaction, or participation by observation alone with the attempt at attunement, albeit at a
distance, with the animals and their lives.
Humans’ ideologically-informed species segregation in their choice of corporeal
comestibles leaves certain animals particularly vulnerable to depersonalisation and devaluation of
their individual and social features and competencies. This reflects in the lack of attentional focus
on these species in scientific inquiries as well as in the attitude of the general public towards
these species, both of which determine political (in)action. For example, an alarmingly high
number of humans ask whether the rescued sheep in the present author’s care exhibit distinct
personalities. Caregivers of individuals belonging to other profoundly instrumentalised and
depersonalised species, such as chickens, pigs or cows, address similar inquiries.
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With an emphasis on land animals bred and raised to satisfy the feeding and clothing
demands of a large part of the human population, this essay contextualises two distinct, albeit
correlated, experiential modalities of animal advocates, rescuers and caregivers. The first part
briefly examines selected relevant psycho-socio-political factors that enable people’s current
distancing from the reality of animal agriculture and their – largely unwitting – participation in
the suffering of both the nonhuman animals trapped in the exploitative systems and the humans
who wish to help them. The second part explores the motivations and capacities of human
rescuers and caregivers to know and relate to animals in sanctuary and rescue settings, and the
emerging science which supports them.

Edible Bodies: Caring and Connection / Uncaring and Disconnection
It is not unusual – quite the opposite, in fact – for human societies to assign culturally edible
bodies among the physically edible bodies in their socio-natural environments. For example, for
the Amazonian Wari’ people, the physically edible bodies of deceased in-laws represented
culturally edible bodies. The entire socio-emotional spectrum of action and reaction at the
occurrence of death, including coping with grief, informed by this ritual was discontinued
following Western intervention and the introduction of burial practices, which some Wari’
people still find discomforting (Harvey 157-160). Animals in some cultures, such as the
indigenous Australian totemic cultures, may be excluded from groups of animals considered as
culturally acceptable corporeal comestibles. In most Western cultures pigs, cows, chickens and
some other species qualify as food, but others, such as dogs and cats, are spared because of their
assigned privilege as companion animals. Stemming from this culturally-shaped normativity,
Westerners are quick to condemn as savage those Asian communities that consume dogs and cats
(and of course those humans practicing cannibalism), ignorant of (or perhaps simply ignoring)
the fact that the Western species segregation is equally arbitrary and a mere result of the
ideology of ‘carnism’, as Melanie Joy terms it.
Following a visit to a pig slaughterhouse, activist Belinda Morris describes her encounter
with one of the pigs awaiting slaughter. She speaks to those who do not or will not see the
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suffering of ‘food animals’ and to those who cannot unsee and unhear it. Referring to the pig she
met but couldn’t rescue, Morris writes:
The people you pass on the street, your friends, colleagues, family, are they the ones
who are going to eat her corpse and never give her a thought? Do they care how
frightened she was? Why do they not care? Why did she not matter to them? 1
The disconnect between those who see and those who do not sets up an intra-specific
discordance, a ragged flaw in the fabric of human society. Morris, who, as a seasoned rescuer
and caregiver, is well aware of the individuality and bio-psycho-social complexity of each animal
going through the killing line, concludes: ‘Walking through a slaughterhouse tears pieces out of
your heart. Living amongst those who keep the slaughterhouses in business does the same.’
By and large, caring for and about animals other than humans is still seen as softness,
implying weakness (Oliver), if not as outright pathological (Gazzola), depending in part on the
degree of care and the species in question. At the same time, most people actively seek to avoid
witnessing the cruelty that they themselves support with their everyday choices, when evidence
is presented to them. The phenomenon is not new. For example, Tolstoy’s attempts to convince
his acquaintance to visit the slaughter yards with him were unsuccessful, despite the fact that the
acquaintance himself was a hunter and not unused to killing (40). 2 A letter published in The

Farmer’s Magazine in 1848 by a neighbour of the Smithfield market in London, calling for the
closure of the market because the sights and sounds of animal suffering at the hand of humans
‘produce an impression on the beholders that no person can adequately describe’(142), is
also telling.
Progressively, slaughter and so-called animal agriculture more generally have become a
concentrated operation, removed from public view (Fitzgerald). The distancing and
concealment in relation to current farming practices and slaughter enable humans, in the words
of Timothy Pachirat, ‘to eat meat without the killers or the killing, without even … the animals
themselves’ (3). The live, pulsing, feeling animal is rendered into the abstraction of a happy cow
on a milk carton, or a defiant bull on a restaurant sign, which in no way depicts the brutal
suffering that the effigy’s real counterpart endures. The steak and the chicken breast exist
disconnected to the once living animal; body parts are elective courses to entertain the palate.
Yet animals are still here, bleeding and bleating louder and more numerous than ever. 3 At the
55

SOMEONE NOT SOMETHING
same time the pressure on activists is growing, with industry-lobbied governments in the U.S.,
Australia and elsewhere attempting to criminalise investigative operations and comparing them
to terrorism. 4 People dedicated to exposing the hidden violence perpetrated on animals in
agriculture and other exploitative and/or extermination environments, including in the wild,
are consequently caught between an aggressive government, supported by a powerful and
profit-driven industry, and a mostly apathetic public, which is capable of ending the violence
but, if it continues to be kept in the dark, will not.
The general denial of and active resistance to witnessing the gravity of the situation
nonhuman animals have been driven into for human interest find some theoretical grounds in the
system justification theory (Jost and Banaji 1994; for review see Jost, Banaji and Nosek 2004),
which predicts humans’ tendency to perceive the larger system that one is embedded into and
dependent upon in a positive light, regardless of how bad the system may be. The research in
this area focuses primarily on the human intraspecies context and the puzzling desire to keep the
status quo even by groups and individuals who would obviously directly benefit from a change.
Nevertheless, system justification can easily be observed in relation to the treatment of animals,
with the wider public believing (or wanting to believe) that the system has provisions in place to
ensure that animals do not suffer while they are being deprived of agency, mutilated, crammed
into cages or pens and abused in numerous other ways before eventually being slaughtered,
regardless of the amount of available evidence demonstrating the opposite. This tendency,
combined with the general urge to justify cognitive inconsistencies in order to reduce ideological
dissonance reported by researchers in cognitive dissonance (Wicklund and Brehm, cited in Jost
et al. 2004), may result in a communication conundrum whereby the suffering animals and the
humans who suffer with them and advocate for their freedom may be perceived as the ones
victimising the perpetrators (both farmers and consumers) and credited with extremism,
intolerance and aggression, or simply dismissed as over-emotional or even mad, as noted above.
However, when paths are uncovered which help reach members of the general public
with undeniable evidence of systemic torture, people’s responses reveal the system’s betrayal of
both nonhuman animals and the humans who unwittingly support it and who are ultimately
responsible for it. A street action known as ‘video challenge’ is a case in point. The video
challenge project consists in recruiting people in the street to watch a short graphic, narrated
video of animals exploited for human consumption.5 In exchange, the viewers receive a small
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financial or food reward. It appears that despite the potentially distracting public venues, the
setup with a laptop and headphones offers sufficient intimacy for the viewers to respond to the
material presented with unguarded candour, leading to reactions of shock, horror, and often
tears. It is perhaps surprising that, at least in the experience of the present author, there is no
anger towards the activists for exposing the viewers to this violence, there is no attempt by the
viewers to justify the violence as often happens in discussions with consumers of animal products
who refuse to confront the reality of animal farming, nor is there any attempt to dismiss the
violence as ‘single occurrences’ – the latter most likely due to the fact that the film shows
various invasive procedures which are routinely performed in animal agriculture (for example,
beak trimming, the grounding of live male chickens, tail docking, et cetera.), as well as of
course slaughter itself.
Naturally, there is no guarantee that the viewers will act upon their new knowledge
with a firm and lasting commitment to implement changes on a personal level and withdraw
from participation in the abuse of the kind they just witnessed. Nevertheless, in addition to
receiving crucial insight into the practice of contemporary meat, egg and milk industries, this
experience may help the viewers understand the shallowness of the calls for tolerance and
acceptance of people’s (mostly uninformed) choice to consume animals, whereby consumption
of animals is viewed as a personal matter with no repercussions for the freedom and wellbeing of
other feeling beings. It may also help the viewers appreciate the strength (as opposed to the
often cited weakness) of people who expose themselves to this violence on a regular basis as
rescuers, carers and/or advocates, and the psychological burden they carry due to such
exposure.
The right often invoked by the general public to use nonhuman animals for their own
convenience not only hurts the animals in question, it also constitutes violence against other
humans as it may instigate vicarious trauma and grief. Vicarious trauma and grief describe the
traumatisation and grief induced by exposure to a primary victim’s experience, affecting
professionals and volunteers who work with human and nonhuman animal victims of violence
(Kastenbaum; McCann and Pearlman). The symptoms are comparable to those experienced by
first-hand victims and can be equally debilitating, with potentially negative consequences for the
individual’s personal and professional life. Recent studies which have looked at the effects of
working with victims of violence in sanctuary and shelter workers and the emerging evidence of
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psychological distress in veterinarians and animal control workers further testify to the reality
of the impact the suffering of nonhuman animals can have on those human animals who are left
to deal with the mostly human-induced damage, and the need for diversified strategies to be
adopted by workers and activists to protect themselves from such and promote the strength
needed to continue the work (see, respectively, Bradshaw, Borchers and Muller-Paisner; Nett
et al. and Tiesman et al.).

You see me, but do you hear me? 6
Spreading awareness of the physical pain and discomfort suffered by animals in exploitative
industries is, understandably, central to all animal protection advocacy, be it abolitionist or
regulatory in nature. However, the focus on physical pain can dim other equally important
aspects of an animal’s being and encourage further objectification of animals and the notion that
enslavement and exploitation might be better justified should that pain be absent or reduced.7
The widely practiced instrumentalisation of animals, with its constant and systemic attempts to
silence them, represses the expression of their being – a being that the human has appropriated
and expects to function principally for human interest – and largely ignores aspects of positive
sentience, 8 such as rewards and pleasures (Balcombe) and the need for self-determination, which
appear to be equally important for wellbeing. Ironically, it also robs humans of the knowledge of
other animals that they seem – for various purposes ranging from mere curiosity or fascination
to facilitated exploitation – determined to increase.

On Sheep and Other Primates
Groundless human projections are quickly evoked to dismiss the proposal of nonhuman animals
possessing characteristics capable of disturbing the biblical foundations promoting human
supremacy, upon which the Western mind was built and within the framework of which it
continues to operate even in secular circles. But increasingly, students of animals’ intra- and
interpersonal competencies agree that accusations of such projections (‘anthropomorphising’)
are often premature and uninformed; they emphasise instead the importance of participating in
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the animals’ world, understanding how it works. Otherwise, ‘chances are, you either ignore
them entirely, or you misunderstand them’ (Brown). Further, the greater the human economic
and ideological investment in the instrumentalisation of particular species, the less appears to be
the motivation to explore and understand the life and being of these species, their social fabric
and individuality within it. In relation to social intelligence, primatologist turned sheepologist,
Thelma Rowell, draws parallels between the methodological faults (and consequent misleading
results 9) of early primatology – before primatology shifted from ethological to more
anthropological research methods (Despret 2006) – and the continuing ethological approach in
research of sheep communities. In the words of Vinciane Despret:
[A]s far as their social expertise is concerned, these animals are certainly on a par with
apes. To put it simply, they are organized – so much so, in fact, that they warrant the
title recently awarded to dolphins, hyenas and elephants, of ‘honorary primate’ (…) Of
all animals, sheep are precisely those that until now have been given the fewest chances.
They have been the victims of what Thelma Rowell calls ‘a hierarchical scandal’ in
ethology: ‘we have given primates multiple chances; we know just about nothing about
the others.’ Of course we know things about them, but clearly those things are
incomparable to what we know about apes. The more research advances, the more
interesting the questions about apes become, and the more these animals turn out to be
endowed with elaborate social and cognitive competencies. By contrast, questions about
the others still primarily concern what they eat. (2006)
A similar criticism of ‘primate chauvinism’ (deWaal, quoted in Abbott, 414) was recently
advanced in relation to the social and cognitive intelligence of fishes, largely citing Redouan
Bshary’s work (Abbott). In essence, humans have blatantly taken everything away from
nonhuman animals – to resort to a hyperbole – and turned them into unfeeling, unthinking
objects for humans’ own convenience. Now the animals have to depend on human research
ingenuity and attentional focus to prove humans wrong, and possibly change their attitudes
towards other animals.
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Knowing in Sanctuary
The primary purpose of sanctuaries for rescued animals is not research per se, but an attempt to
provide a safe environment free of physical and other suffering, as well as encouraging positive
sentience and self-determination (as much as an ultimately still captive setting allows it). In
order to achieve these goals, however, informal but nonetheless meticulous research and
observations are de facto being carried out on a daily basis for the entire duration of the animals’
residency at the sanctuary, a residency which normally lasts until death. The relational dynamics
characteristic of these settings offers alternative modalities of knowing and understanding
animals, which inform methods of care as well as advocacy. Considering the difference between
true wellbeing and ‘welfare’ – a term that has largely grown to denote attempts to reduce
animal suffering under exploitative conditions10 – long-time activist and rescuer Patty Mark
suggests that it may be easier to understand the extent of the violence and deprivation animals
endure in an exploitative context by considering these same animals in a sanctuary environment
after they have been rescued. ‘The damage becomes much more evident when the animals are at
last allowed autonomy,’ she says, when they are given the freedom, for example, to not be
touched, picked up, restricted, immobilised by a foreign hand, ‘when you watch them
protecting and nurturing their bodies and selves like we do our own, when you watch them
slowly heal physically and psychologically – sometimes it takes years – beginning to enjoy life
and friendships with other animals, including humans’ (107).
The intersubjective space of being together, created by the partners (the rescued
animals and their carers), enables a relatively fluid transfer of information (albeit of nonverbal
nature) and relationship-building. Dismantling the prejudicial barrier based on culturally primed
species segregation uncovers new foundations which enable a more comprehensive
understanding of other animals, promoting empathic recognition and informing humans’
attitude towards them. ‘All animals,’ as Tom Regan puts it, ‘are somebody – someone with a
life of their own. Behind those eyes is a story, the story of their life in their world as they
experience it.’ The ability to hear these stories is no empty projection of a delusional and
overemotional self, as it is often derided as being. The ability to hear them is critical to ensure
the best possible care and physical as well as emotional and mental rehabilitation. Aside from
strictly medical aspects, such care has to take into consideration a myriad of species-specific
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properties, both cultural and natural, along with, of course, the personal specificities of the
individual in question.
As a consequence of this subjective encounter, of living and being together with other
animal species, and in certain circumstances being able to experience their group dynamics,
sanctuary caregivers (including humans who provide sanctuary/home to singular companion
animals, like cats and dogs) may develop capacities of seeing, hearing and understanding animals
in ways that many other humans cannot. Unlike humans who participate in the exploitation of
other animals and whose vision is by definition blurred as a consequence of this utilitarian
‘relationship,’ sanctuary caregivers are freer of the mental and practical limitations that such
instrumentalisation entails and their interest is focused on true wellbeing of the animals in care.
Most of them are also much less constrained by the doctrinal requirements that govern Western
science, which is itself embedded in a tradition replete with interpretational and methodological
errors, some of which are noted in this essay. Mindless anthropomorphising would not just be a
futile process, but it can also adversely impact the animal in care. Thus it is essential to create a
space which, while recognising species-specific characteristics, allows the development of an
adequate level of intercommunication, in which the human listens, as a non-passive recipient, to
the individual nonhuman animals (and/or a community of animals) who are telling their story.
Each animal is a product of nature and nurture, i.e. genes and the socio-natural environment
he/she grew up in and is embedded into; as such each animal is unique, as are his/her story and
individual needs. The failure to recognise this stems not from the animals’ lacki of individuality
and complexity but from humans’ not spending enough time with them, as marine mammal
expert Toni Frohoff (cited in Siebert) indicates, or approaching them with a predetermined,
culturally-biased, oftentimes voyeuristic attitude which does not allow them to truly hear them.
What emerges from this process is an extremely complex picture of animals’ psycho-social
existence, congruent with various theoretical frameworks, some of which are discussed below,
indicating the need for a paradigm shift, a shift unlikely to happen if the attention remains on
how to justify the use of animals instead of on the animals themselves.
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More Than Meets the Eye
Donald Broom and Ken Johnson famously wrote that millions of years of evolution and
adaptation cannot be overridden by a few thousand years of domestication and a few decades of
close confinement (33). They cite, specifically, the unlikelihood of a hen adapting to live in a
cage any time soon, regardless of the level of genetic manipulation involved. More recently,
G.A. Bradshaw (2005; 2009) took a step further and established the field of trans-species
psychology (TSP). TSP is based on current available evidence which indicates that while
morphological differences among the brains of various animal species result in the information
being distributed and processed differently as a consequence of adaptation to specific physical
environments, the differences are not qualitative in nature. TSP works on the premise that
animals (including humans) are born with specific neurobiological dispositions that require
specific socio-natural environmental input for physically and emotionally balanced development.
The disruption of the biological and/or historical normative (e.g. by anthropogenic
interference) affects the delicate balance that has slowly emerged through the species’ evolution
and the manner in which this predicates optimal developmental and living conditions. This leads
to compromised wellbeing and, when the stressors intensify to unmanageable levels, to the
emergence of severe psychological scars and trauma, which not only affect the wellbeing of the
individual in question but, via trans-generational transfer, also impacts on posterity (see for
example Bagot and Meaney; DeGregorio). 11 The trauma imprinted in the animal’s subconscious
can only be adequately accessed and reorganised (aiming at healing) by providing a secure
environment where the affected animals are given the opportunity to re-create themselves as
new, mentally balanced individuals. This is a space that allows and encourages selfdetermination and mutual respect as opposed to imposing control. The healing approach is a
relational model, reflecting the importance of non-linguistic, right-brain-to-right-brain affective
communication (Schore 2011) and attachment relations (in the formative period but also later in
life) for normative development and functioning, and the necessity of recreating a positive
developmental context for successful repair when disruption occurs.
Neuropsychologist Allan Schore accuses the behavioural model and its successor, the
cognitive-behavioural model, of having ‘plagued psychiatry and psychology’ to the detriment of
human wellbeing (2012, 4). Similarly, proponents and practitioners of TSP agree that focusing
on behaviour – behaviour being a symptom not the cause – and attempting to correct behaviour
62

SOMEONE NOT SOMETHING
alone does nothing to address or eliminate the root of the problem. As a consequence, the
wellbeing of the animal(s) continues to be compromised even though the behaviour may appear
more in tune with humans’ expectations: ‘broken’ on the outside (behaviourally), but likely
broken inside, too. This widespread approach to animals under study and in attempted
rehabilitation also appears to propagate the objectification of animals more generally, further
dimming options of learning to appreciate the complexity nature has endowed them with.
Behaviourism, as the practice of conveying exclusively what one could see, Carl Safina
notes, developed as a necessity to establish the study of animal behaviour as a science at a time
when brain science was in its infancy and little systemic observation had been made of free-living
animals conducting their normative lives (26). This ‘objective’ approach was also intended to
dispel many myths surrounding nonhuman animals, stemming from centuries of folklore and
superstition, portraying animals as caricatures of human vices and virtues. ‘In establishing the
study of behaviour as a science,’ Safina writes, ‘it had originally been helpful to make
“anthropomorphism” a word that raised the red flag. But as lesser intellects followed the Nobel
Prize-winning pioneers [Konrad Lorenz, Nikolaas Tinbergen and Karl von Frisch],
“anthropomorphism” became a pirate flag. If the word was hoisted, an attack was
imminent’ (27).
Behaviourism managed to instigate and consolidate the fear of anthropomorphism,
which remains widespread today. The objectivity that behaviourism strived for, however, fell
short of expectations. There is always more than meets the eye, and the nature of the attention
the observer applies also plays its part. This can lead, for example, to ignoring species
culturally/ideologically deemed uninteresting, such as sheep, or paying excessive attention to
certain behaviours while ignoring others of equal or higher relevance for the overall
understanding of an observed individual or community. In her book Animal Friendships,
zoologist Anne Dagg laments that for a long time research focused on aggressive and
reproductive behaviours among nonhuman animals and ignored the less ‘exciting’ though more
regular congenial relations, undoubtedly contributing to the heavily distorted picture humans
still nurture of other animals’ lives and relations. In The Evolution of Morality and Religion,
Donald Broom concurs that cooperation and convivial behaviours are more common, and
reminds the reader that when considering sociality within animal communities, it is critical to
take into account not only what individuals do but also what they do not do. In fact, ‘[m]ost
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altruistic behaviour involves refraining from doing things which would be easy to do but which
would harm others, even if the perpetrator might benefit in some way from doing this’
(2003, 40).
Ultimately, the observed phenomena cannot escape subjective evaluation and
interpretation as humans are faced with choices of actions which impact on nonhuman animals.
For example, deciding that nonhuman animals’ interpersonal relationships don’t matter is no
more objective than deciding they do matter. The bond between mother and infant is a wellrecognised phenomenon, both in scholarly literature and in popular knowledge. The disruption
of this bond can lead to production loss in animals exploited for their bodies and secretions;
therefore, effort has been put into research attempting to minimise the inconvenience, resulting,
for example, in various available techniques of forced weaning (e.g. Schichowski, Moors and
Gauly). Even when it comes to ‘commodities’ such as farm animals, the bond is obviously there,
but, production loss aside, by and large the bond does not matter.

Born To Be Free
Ironically, it was to the work of ethologist Konrad Lorenz and other ethological enquiries at the
time that John Bowlby, the father of (human) attachment theory, owed his breakthrough as he
was trying to get away from contemporary human-orientated behavioural theories and
approaches in the field of interpersonal attachment (Bretherton). The latter were centred
around food acquisition and unable to explain the empirical data demonstrating adverse effects
on the development of infants subjected to separation from caregivers. Harlow’s invasive
experiments on rhesus monkeys provided further confirmation that ‘man’ (and other animals)
cannot live by milk alone, as he put it (1958, 677). 12 Further research has revealed that the
caregiver as the infant’s primary source of external stimuli (for humans and other animals), acts,
in conjunction with the infant’s own system, as a regulatory power for essential developmental
processes, which affect both the individual’s psychobiological adaptiveness as well as gene
expression (summarised in Bradshaw and Schore 2006). The primary caregiver’s capacity to
mediate the infant’s affective arousal states contributes to the development of an experiential
matrix, which creates a sense of safety for the infant and encourages further explorative
behaviour of the social and physical environment. This secure attachment ultimately leads to
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adaptive physical and mental health. Poor and dysregulated transmissions within the attachment
relations are ‘affectively burnt’ (Schore 2012, 35) into the infant’s maturing brain, with the
brain consequentially developing unconscious internal working models based on insecurity
with potentially vulnerable psycho-physiological outcomes and trans-generational transfer, as
noted above.
However, and fortunately, the capacity for interpersonal psycho-bio-regulation
continues into adulthood (Hofer), which opens doors to opportunities for healing. Most of the
animals in sanctuaries come from dysfunctional developmental conditions and/or have suffered
physical and/or mental trauma later in life. They do not come equipped with biographies;
sometimes little or nothing is known about their past. It is the role of the sanctuary caregiver to
attempt to compile such a biography, to work their way through the complex internal landscape
of the rescued individuals to ensure optimal psycho-physical care and to promote wellbeing. A
sufficient level of ‘working knowledge’ is usually attainable by means of the intersubjective
space and nonverbal communication proposed above. While sanctuaries, like any other captive
environment, in most cases do not enable full self-determination (partly for the animals’ own
safety), 13 allowing the animals co-participation in the healing process and their own lives instead
of exercising control, enhancing positive aspects of sentience, and showing them respect instead
of trying to infantilise them, can ensure a higher level of wellbeing and restore some of the
animals’ dignity.
In her book Interspecies Ethics, Cynthia Willett reminds the reader of African-American
abolitionist Frederick Douglass’ doubts that an appeal to the moral sentiments of white people
would suffice to abolish black slavery:
White people could not generate sympathy for a slave unless that slave asserted some
significant degree of agency and demanded, through that assertion of agency,
recognition from others… A display of vulnerability and an appeal for sympathy do not
suffice to generate the solidarity that an egalitarian political ethics requires. (38)
If Douglass was correct, and the odds are he was, how can nonhuman animals, particularly
captive so-called farm animals, these ‘quasi-artefacts’ of ours, to use Freya Mathews’
unflattering description, ever exhibit a level of agency sufficient to demonstrate equality without
risk of being shot for it? Mathews does not seem to think such endeavour is necessary. While
65

SOMEONE NOT SOMETHING
domestication was wrong when it occurred, she opines, and it would be equally wrong to try to
domesticate wild animals in the future, this does not mean that the farming of species that are
already domesticated is wrong today. The ‘pact’ between our and their species permits us to use
them for our own purposes. ‘They are no longer sovereign beings,’ Mathews writes, ‘they owe
their existence to us… We are obliged to care for them but we also have certain rights over
their destiny’ (264). This is a curious but not uncommon position, and as such it deserves
further consideration. It is beyond the scope of this article to attempt elaboration of the often
cited ‘pact’ that humans want to believe they have with oppressed species. However, adhering
to the nature of argumentation in the present article, at least three of the numerous points that
question the ethics and logic of defending animal agriculture and its inherent instrumentalisation
should be given some brief attention here.
Firstly, the position that domestication occurred in the distant past, and that at present
we are simply left with ancestral ‘artefacts’ which we have an obligation to look after, is both
inaccurate and highly misleading. Animals trapped in the exploitative systems sprung with and
promoted by domestication are subjected to ongoing manipulation to increase production and
profit. Over the past sixty years the size of a broiler chicken has quadrupled (Zuidhof et al.),
bodies of other animals, enslaved for human dietary choices, such as turkeys and pigs, have also
substantially increased in size, leaving their underdeveloped bones and internal organs struggling
to keep up with the unnatural body mass they are supposed to support but often cannot. ‘They
are bred to be slaughtered at six months of age,’ explained a sanctuary owner whose hallway has
been taken up by a disabled rescued pig suffering from apophysiolysis: 14 ‘this and similar
conditions are not uncommon, particularly in breeding sows, who are obviously kept alive past
the six months’ (Vesenjak-Kutlačić; Vizcaíno et al.). Sheep are another species under constant
attack. In Australia, about one in four lambs (fifteen million annually) dies from exposure. To
address production loss, the industry is engaging in genetic manipulation aiming at increasing the
number of lambs per birth, pushing the mothers well beyond their physical (and undoubtedly
emotional) limits, likely increasing death rates of lambs, although the overall number of lambs to
be turned into meat may nevertheless increase (Animals Australia).
The second point, which is also often ignored by proponents of animal agriculture
(‘humane’ or other) is the animals’ interpersonal bonds and social structures. Animals who are
allowed a measure of physical and psychological freedom exhibit social preferences (Bode,
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Wood and Franks) and can form deep, lasting bonds (for example Holland), inclusive of but not
limited to the parent-child dyad. When humans claim rights over animals’ destinies and enact
such rights, for example by choosing to kill someone from the community, they may be
breaking up meaningful interpersonal relations as well as affecting the animals on a societal level.
When the question of human grief and loss is considered within a multicultural framework, as it
should be, and is subsequently stripped of the various culture-specific attributes used to
propagate the myth of human uniqueness, it appears that there is nothing species-specific about
human loss that couldn’t be applied interspecifically, as the present author has suggested in the
past (2013).
The third point returns to Broom and Johnson’s assertion, cited above, of the perpetual
victory of evolution and adaptation over domestication. As an example, they discuss the
Australian wild boar – communities of domesticated pigs who had strayed from farms and
successfully returned to a wild state (33). More recently, communities of rescued hens and
roosters at the VINE sanctuary in the U.S. achieved something similar, 15 and now inhabit the
nearby forest, living a wild life, free from human intervention (jones).
Could such re-wilding be the strongest demonstration of agency that nonhuman animals
could offer, along the lines of Douglass’ thinking, to convince humans of their equality and
desire for freedom – a kind of peaceful revolution, Mandela-style rather than Orwellian? Are
not the animals who have freed themselves from slavery demonstrating just that: the desire to be
free and the capacity to live this freedom, which includes negotiations with a highly complex
socio-natural environment that goes beyond food acquisition and reproduction success,
requiring high levels of cognitive and emotional sophistication, which is increasingly being
recognised for nonhuman animal societies? Admittedly, most domesticated animals would not
be able to survive in the wild, mainly due to the genetic mutilations humans have subjected their
bodies to. But have humans managed to destroy their soul?
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Conclusion
In the 1970s and 1980s, Donald Griffin and Gordon Burghardt began advocating for the
inclusion of the subjective mental experiences of nonhuman animals into the field of cognitive
ethology (Griffin, 482). This proposition was met with some resistance at first, but over the
following decades an increasing number of scientists have embraced the idea of nonhuman
animals’ subjective lives, enabling animals’ subjectivity to grow from a taboo topic into the
widely popularised subject that it is today. Similarly, ten years after Bradshaw (2005) first
proposed trans-species psychology following her diagnosis of PTSD in elephants, recognition of
human-comparable psychological effects of violence and depravation on nonhuman animals is on
the rise (Dasgupta). The growing scholarly appreciation of human-nonhuman animal
comparability reflects the general public’s expanding awareness of other animals’ lives and
being. However, millennia-long conditioning, which has propagated speciesism, carnism and
instrumentalisation, continues to impede the appreciation of the complexities of animals’
individualities and their sociality both on scholarly and popular levels, precluding political
change. Through participation in their lives, through encounters that do not a priori supress the
other (regardless of whether the other is a human or a nonhuman animal), modalities of knowing
and understanding emerge that are likely to be missed when such relatability is dismissed in
advance. Had Derrida reached out to the cat instead of pondering over her otherness, how much
of the philosophy of the Takers (Quinn) 16 would he have been able to bring down with a single
act? Such acts occur regularly in sanctuaries, and increasingly even in science. They testify to the
animals’ sophisticated cognitive, psychological and social capacities that have emerged through
parallel evolution – that is, not below but along with ours – suggesting that their ancient selves,
regardless of human intervention, remain pretty much alive. The humans who have grown to
embrace other animal nations as equals enjoy the delicate beauty trans-species
communitarianism has to offer, but they also experience immense grief stemming from the
anthropogenic violence their conspecifics perpetrate upon these nations. It is time, now, that
people extended some consideration to that grief, and all that it signifies.
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Notes
1

Published on social media (Facebook) 24 March 2015. Used with author’s permission.

2

It is beyond the scope of this essay to delve into the question of differences between hunting

versus slaughterhouse and farm work. Suffice to note that the physical distance between the
hunter and the hunted, characteristic of most hunting practices, may allow an amplitude of
psychological distancing that may not be affordable on the killing floor of a slaughterhouse, and
people may also perceive hunting as being more of a ‘fair game’ compared to the slaughterhouse
where animals are forced to in order to be slaughtered with no chance of escaping such fate.
3

According to conservative figures from the U.N. Food and Agriculture organisation the

number of land animals killed for food annually exceeds sixty-five billion. Cited in the FARM
report, available at: http://farmusa.org/statistics11.html (Accessed 25 August 2015). Figures
for aquatic animals are unavailable.
4

The FBI considers the animal rights and environmental movements the number one domestic

terrorist threat. So-called ‘ag-gag’ laws, criminalising documentation and the spreading of
evidence of corporate animal abuse, have been introduced in various states in the U.S.:
http://www.greenisthenewred.com/blog/about/ (Accessed 26 August 2015). Similar
initiatives are currently being undertaken in Australia, see for example
https://www.voiceless.org.au/the-issues/ag-gag (Accessed 26 August 2015). The first ag-gag
legislation, disguised as a biosecurity bill, was passed in NSW in September 2015.
5

The idea is not new. It features already in the award-winning documentary film The Witness

(2000), but it was successfully revived in June 2015 by a group of activists in Sydney, Australia,
and is currently spreading around the world.
6

Cf. Bradshaw, G.A. ‘You see me, but do you hear me? The science and sensibility of trans-

species dialogue’. Feminism & Psychology, no. 20, 2010, pp. 407–419.
7

This is something animal advocates should be well aware of to avoid dissemination of undesired

messages among the broader public.
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8

Increased sensitivity to nonhuman animals as complex socio-biological entities has sprung a

‘movement’ within animal welfare circles advocating for greater consideration of positive
sentience by factoring in environment- and sociality-focused needs and potentialities as markers
of wellbeing along with the absence of negative stimuli (see, for example, Mellor; Yeates and
Main). While this is certainly a refreshing perspective, its practical limitations are not
insignificant. The observance of positive sentience could lead to the emergence of a boutique
industry, which could serve its own purpose and possibly benefit a small number of animals, but
it appears to be an unrealistic option to solve the current pressing issue of animal wellbeing.
Such industry would be unable to meet the current demands for animal products by the ever
growing human population (see note 3) for various reasons, including our planet’s space
limitations, and it could certainly not match the current financial affordability of animal
products, which in an environment of growing economic pressure is not a negligible factor.
Further, apart from animals forming the heart of the production line to whom regulations
concerning positive welfare could apply to various extents, the current establishments also
comprise animals that are deemed completely superfluous by the businesses in question (for
example, male chickens in the egg industry); as such these animals need to be disposed of in
timely fashion and in ways that are financially the least impactful. Higher ‘humane’ standards
would have to address the issue of these superfluous animals as well as the question of slaughter
of both animals raised for meat and so-called spent animals in other exploitative sectors of
agribusiness; see also note 10. Ultimately, animal agriculture is a business and its existence
depends on its profitability. If the latter is challenged by welfare standards, the business will
either cease to exist or it will find ways of disguising or underplaying the abuse. This is already
happening with issues concerning basic physical ‘painism’ and is also reflected in the widespread
misleading advertising of so-called free-range and similar settings implying (but not necessarily
implementing) higher welfare standards to please the public and its growing awareness of animal
use and abuse.
9

An interesting example that sparked and perpetrated the myth of aggression and competition as

a societal norm in primates’ communities comes from research on baboons, albeit the erroneous
research conclusions were less a result of inadequate observation than they were of the highly
unnatural and traumatogenic captive environment the research was conducted in. As Despret
summarises, from the observations of baboons in the London zoo in the late 1920s by zoologist
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Solly Zuckerman a thesis was developed which presupposed dominance-hierarchy as the main
principle of social organisation in primate societies generally. This thesis remained dominant for
several decades to the extent that when the dominance principle could not be observed in a
particular primate community, the apparent absence of it would be conceptualised as ‘latent
dominance’ (Despret 2009).
10

See note 7. In her interview Mark recalls that ‘the worst suffering and torment I’ve ever

witnessed was in a New South Wales slaughterhouse when a group of free-range pigs were
brought in for slaughter. Coming from their “good life” on the paddocks, to the noisy, crowded
kill lines where they could hear other pigs screaming, smell the blood; they panicked, anguished
and in fear, their mouths foamed, their eyes rolled. No words can describe it’ (109).
11

A recent study demonstrates trans-generational effects of neonatal experience (tail- docking

and simulated mild infection) on pain responses in sheep (Clark et al.).
12

Harlow’s methods involved removing baby rhesus monkeys from their natural mothers and

exposing them to mother surrogates. Two types of mother surrogates were developed: an
unpleasantly hard surrogate made of wire-mesh, and a soft, cloth surrogate able to supply higher
contact comfort than the wire version. The experiments show absence of attachment to the wire
figure even when ‘she’ was the sole food provider.
13

In some rare cases rescued animals have managed to return to a wild state (jones).

14

Fracture of the ischial tuberosity of the tail bone.

15

http://vine.bravebirds.org/

16

The notion of Takers as contrasted with Leavers is rendered beautifully by Anthony Hopkins

as protagonist of the film Instinct, 1999.
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